The debate in New Zealand over whether to adopt a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system was based on a number of predictions about the effects of electoral systems. After four elections under MMP we are now in a better position to evaluate the validity of these claims. We find that both proponents and opponents made claims that proved to be true but there were also unforeseen consequences that neither side predicted.
Introduction
In 1996, after nearly a century's experience of a single-member plurality (SMP) electoral system, New Zealand held its first election under a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system. Under MMP, voters cast one vote for a constituency or 'electorate' MP in a single-member district (SMD) and another for a political party. The latter vote, referred to in New Zealand as the 'party vote' is ultimately the most important as it determines the overall partisan composition of parliament. Of the 120 members of parliament, slightly more than half are directly elected by SMP rules while the remaining members are elected from a closed party list. Parties gain representation by either winning a constituency seat or by winning 5 per cent of the nationwide party list vote. unicameral parliamentary system, an appointed Head of State with limited powers, and no 'fundamental law', the powers of the New Zealand government were described, prior to the adoption of MMP, as 'unbridled' (Palmer, 1979 ). An SMP system combined with few checks on government power meant that single-party majority governments could hold office on a basis of much less than half the valid votes. From 1935, two major parties dominated Parliament. As smaller parties emerged, the major parties' shares of the votes steadily fell from mid-century. By the 1990s, the relationship between vote shares and seats had become increasingly disproportionate. The catalyst for electoral system change was a succession of two elections in 1978 and 1981 in which the governing party was returned to power with fewer votes than the opposition. In 1984, a Royal Commission was appointed to look into the electoral system, given wide terms of reference, and a membership of genuinely open-minded persons. In 1986, it recommended adoption of MMP, if approved by referendum (Royal Commission on the Electoral System, 1986).
Adopting MMP: Expectations
Advocates of MMP wished to reduce the odds that a single political party could gain a majority of seats in Parliament and govern alone with 'unbridled power'. A model of government based on coalitions or minority governments was posed as the alternative. The main thrust of the Report of the Royal Commission was, as Katz argues (1997, 307) , to encourage more broadly based majority government. Opposition to MMP came from the New Zealand Business Roundtable (BRT), an organization of chief executives of major New Zealand business firms who become members by invitation. It advocates policies that promote 'a free enterprise system and market-oriented economy'. Before the first of two referendums in 1992 and 1993, the BRT, commissioned a defence of the SMP system taking a neo-liberal position favouring marketdriven policies (Cowen, et al., 1992) . A summary of the claims of proponents and opponents discussed in this paper can be found in Table 1 .
Government responsiveness and accountability
The Royal Commission and the Report from the BRT relied on somewhat different theories and evidence. There were some similar expectations about outcomes but different judgements about the consequences. In terms of government formation, both advocates and opponents agreed that under MMP coalition governments would be more likely. However, they disagreed over the implications for government accountability and responsiveness.
